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edge that the findings and conclusions presented in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Foundation.
The authors are grateful to Don Baylor at the Annie E. Casey Foundation for his guidance and support 
throughout the project. We extend our thanks to Elaine Maag at the Urban Institute for offering her expertise 
related to interactions between the Earned Income Tax Credit and dependent care flexible spending ac-
counts.
In this two-part series, we provide a field scan of the dependent care flexible spending accounts (DCFSAs) 
landscape, focusing on child care expenses. We describe the proliferation and utilization of these programs, 
identify barriers to usage by low- to moderate-income (LMI) parents, and explain features of DCFSA design 
and program administration that address some of these challenges. We also identify opportunities for im-
provements in public policies and employer practices that can level the DCFSA playing field for LMI employ-
ees.
Part 1 defines DCFSAs and outlines the process through which employees may obtain reimbursement, the 
benefits that employers may experience by offering DCFSAs, patterns of adoption of such plans by employ-
ers and employees, and employee decision-making regarding plan participation.
In Part 2, we describe features of DCFSA design and program administration that address some of the chal-
lenges and provide a set of policy proposals for consideration by both employers and policymakers.
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II. Executive Summary
In 1983, the title of an article in the trade journal Pension World proclaimed, “A No-Cost Way to Provide De-
pendent Care Benefits,” (Alden, 1983). Dependent care flexible spending accounts (DCFSAs) had burst onto 
the employee benefits scene.
Never specified in or intended by any legislation, DCFSAs were forged from the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 by a handful of employee benefits consulting firms that saw an opportunity to create a new line of 
business. By naming their new product “dependent care flexible spending accounts,” the consulting firms 
framed them as a way for employers to lay claim to providing dependent care benefits for their employees 
(Kelly, 2003).
Never mind that employers would not actually be spending money on dependent care – the accounts would 
enable employees to reimburse themselves with their own pre-tax dollars. Employers could offer a depen-
dent care benefit for the low cost of having the accounts administered by the consulting firms that had 
invented them (Kelly, 2003).
“A No-Cost Way to Provide Dependent Care Benefits,” Pension World declared. Indeed, the accounts proved 
to be quite a good deal for the consulting firms, who built successful lines of business administering the ac-
counts. They are also a good deal for employers, who gain tax advantages (reduced payroll taxes) and re-
coup a portion of salary expenses through employee forfeitures of unused account balances.
However, they are not such a good deal for employees, who reap far fewer benefits.
Higher-paid parents may have the cash flow to manage the “double-hit” of setting aside pre-tax dollars for 
reimbursement of child care expenses already paid for out-of-pocket. They may also have enough tax li-
ability to make reimbursing themselves for child care expenses with pre-tax dollars (up to $5,000, a fraction 
of total child care costs for many families) worth the effort, since high-income families disproportionately 
benefit from DCFSAs (National Women’s Law Center [NWLC], 2016). 
For example:
A Head of Household tax filer designates $2,000 of their annual income to contribute to a DCFSA.
If this employee has household income of between $13,850 and $52,850, they would pay a 
marginal tax rate of 12% on taxable income above $13,850 and up to $52,850.
This employee would save $240 on the $2,000 that they contributed to a DCFSA.
If this employee has household income of between $52,850 and $84,200 instead, they would 
pay a marginal rate of 22% for taxable income above $52,850 and up to $84,200.
This employee would save $440 on the $2,000 that they contributed to a DCFSA.
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As currently designed, DCFSAs do not represent a level playing field for low- to moderate-income (LMI) par-
ents struggling to pay for child and other dependent care. 
In Part 1 of this two-part series, we review the DCFSA landscape from the perspective of LMI parents, illumi-
nating the nearly unmanageable barriers to participation and highly complex decision-making process they 
must face to squeeze even the smallest benefit from these programs. 
In Part 2, we examine some infrequently-provided options in DCFSA design and program administration, as 
well as opportunities for improvements in public policies that can help level the DCFSA playing field for LMI 
parents.
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1. Introduction
Over the past 40 years, the US economy has experienced a massive shift in the conditions of work, particu-
larly for those at the lower-end of the labor market. High-paying jobs available to workers without college 
degrees have dwindled while unstable employment in service sector jobs has surged (Bernhardt, 2011).
Employers previously absorbed much of the risk associated with employment, such as rising health care 
costs, but have now largely shifted this risk onto workers. Organizations have accomplished this “risk shift” 
by designing jobs that include features such as part-time hours, unstable and unpredictable work schedules, 
and lack of employee benefits such as paid time off and health care (Hacker, 2006). These unstable, inflexible 
jobs can make arranging high-quality child care difficult. Families in such situations may also find it difficult 
to utilize existing child care support resources, such as state and federal child care subsidies, which can have 
serious financial repercussions (Henly et al., 2015).
The economic strain on employees generated by such employment practices has produced the need for 
creative approaches to supporting these workers through avenues that can provide savings on expenses 
such as high-quality child care. Low-quality child care is associated with negative outcomes for children and, 
thus, the inability to pay for better-quality care puts children at risk (Loeb, Fuller, Kagan, & Carrol, 2004).
The Revenue Act of 1978 created Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code that established cafeteria benefit 
plans. It was eventually interpreted in such a way as to give employers the option to offer their employees 
flexible spending accounts (FSAs) for both dependent care and health care expenses. FSAs allow employ-
ees to divert a portion of their earnings to be used for qualifying expenses on a pre-tax basis. Employees’ 
diverted earnings are not subject to either federal income taxes or to payroll taxes for Social Security (FICA), 
Medicare, or Unemployment Insurance. In addition to reducing taxable income for some workers and en-
abling them to pay for qualifying expenses on a tax-free basis, employers benefit from reduced payroll taxes 
(i.e., the employer half of FICA and Medicare and Unemployment Insurance) that they would otherwise pay 
based upon their employees’ taxable income (26 USC §125).
This two-part series will provide an overview of dependent care FSAs, focusing on child care expenses. We 
will describe the proliferation and utilization of these programs, identify barriers to usage by low- to moder-
ate-income (LMI) workers (those with household incomes at or below Area Median Income as defined by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, ~$50,000 per year), and examine some infrequently-
provided options in DCFSA design and program administration. We will also identify opportunities for im-
provements in public policies and employer practices that can help level the DCFSA playing field for LMI 
parents.
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2. Dependent Care “Spending” Accounts? In Reality, Dependent Care 
     Reimbursement Accounts
2.1 How the Money Goes In: DCFSA Contributions
2.2 What Child Care Expenses Are Eligible for Reimbursement?
Contrary to their name, DCFSAs are not structured to allow employees to spend money on dependent care. 
Rather, these accounts enable employees to receive reimbursement for qualifying expenses for which they 
have already paid out-of-pocket. After employees have paid for care, they must submit documentation of 
these expenses to their plans’ administrators to receive reimbursement. 
Many employers outsource administration of these plans to third parties, such as employee benefits consult-
ing firms, and with good reason. DCFSAs have complex rules and, as a tax-advantaged benefit, the potential 
consequences for failing to adhere to the rules can be serious for employers (U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement, 2006; Internal Revenue Service [IRS], 2018).
The current maximum annual amount of pre-tax earnings that employees may divert to a DCFSA to be used 
for reimbursement for qualifying expenses is $5,000. Employees must elect contribution amounts prior to 
the beginning of the plan year, which typically begins January 1st and ends December 31st. Employees’ 
elected amounts are then divided by the number of pay periods in the plan year and contributions are de-
ducted from each paycheck equally throughout the year on a pre-tax basis. 
These elected amounts can only be changed during the plan year if employees experience qualifying events, 
such as a change in marital status, the birth or adoption of a child, the death of a dependent, or a change 
in work status. Employees’ diverted earnings are not subject to federal income taxes or to payroll taxes for 
Social Security (FICA), Medicare, or Unemployment Insurance. Thus, DCFSAs offer a financial benefit to em-
ployees via reduced taxes.
According to IRS regulations, qualifying child care expenses are eligible for reimbursement if the care is for a 
qualifying dependent and is necessary for the parent(s) to work, look for work, or attend school full-time. 
A qualifying dependent is a child who:
•	 Is under the age of 13 years old or an older child who is not physically or mentally able to care for 
themselves, and
•	 Lives with the holder of the DCFSA for at least half the year.
In order to be considered to be attending school full-time, the parent must be:
•	 Enrolled as a full-time student;
•	 A full-time student for at least five months out of a calendar year; and
•	 Attending an eligible school, which includes high schools, universities, colleges, and technical and 
trade schools. 
Institutions that do not qualify as “schools” are on-the-job training courses, online schools, and correspon-
dence schools. 
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2.3 How the Money Comes Out: Requirements and Processes for Reimbursement
Qualifying expenses include child care that is provided:
•	 In the parents’ home or the home of the child care provider, such as a nanny, au pair, babysitter, or 
relative who is not the dependent of the holder of the DCFSA;
•	 Outside of the home in a daycare center that meets all state and local regulations for such centers;
•	 At a before- or after-school program for care that is required so that the parents can work, look for 
work, or attend school full-time;
•	 During times in which school is not in session at a day camp, even for camps that are focused on a 
particular topic such as soccer or music as long as they allow parents to work, look for work, or at-
tend school full-time;
•	 By someone other than the DCFSA holder’s spouse or the child’s other parent; and
•	 By someone who has a valid tax payer identification number.
For children under kindergarten-age, education expenses for preschools and early childhood education 
centers qualify for reimbursement. However, once a child reaches kindergarten and later grades, tuition 
expenses for any school no longer qualify for reimbursement. 
Enrichment programs, lessons, and tutoring expenses do not typically qualify for reimbursement nor do ex-
penses associated with overnight camps since they are not considered work-related expenses (U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury, 2017).
Health care flexible spending accounts (HCFSAs) give employees access to the full amount of their annual 
elected contributions immediately at the start of the plan year. This so-called uniform coverage rule relates 
to IRS regulations of Section 125 cafeteria plans, to which DCFSAs are explicitly not subject (26 USC §125).
DCFSA funds are not available to employees for reimbursement until the contributions have been deducted 
from their paychecks. If employees’ submitted child care expenses exceed the balance in their DCFSAs at the 
time of submission, they will not be reimbursed for the excess expenses until further deductions have been 
taken from their paychecks.
DCFSA plans include a use-it-or-lose-it provision, meaning, any account balance at the end of the plan year is 
forfeited and reverts to the employer. Most plans provide a grace period of 75 days after the plan year ends. 
However, employers are not required to include this provision in their DCFSAs. During the grace period, 
employees may submit expenses incurred towards the end of the plan year or expenses incurred during the 
grace period. 
Employers stand to benefit from offering DCFSAs through reduced payroll tax liabilities, reduced salary 
expenses (recouped from DCFSA forfeitures), and, in theory, the potential for positive business outcomes 
arising from increasing the attractiveness of their employee benefits offerings.
3. How Employers Benefit From DCFSAs
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3.1 Payroll Tax Savings
DCFSAs enable employers to reduce their payroll tax expenses since employees’ pre-tax contributions are 
not subject to payroll taxes. In 2018, the Social Security tax rate for employers was 6.2%, the rate for Medi-
care was 1.45%, and the Unemployment Insurance tax rate was 6.0% for a total of 13.65% (U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, 2018). When employees reduce their taxable incomes through DCFSA contributions, employ-
ers are relieved of payroll taxes for Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance, which can thus 
represent a savings of nearly 8% (Warner, Ribeiro, & Smith, 2003). 
For example, an employer would generally owe payroll taxes of:
$8,190 on the salary of an employee who earned $60,000 per year
$3,720 for Social Security,
$870 towards Medicare, and 
$3,600 towards Unemployment Insurance. 
However, if the employee contributed the maximum of $5,000 to a DCFSA, the employer would owe 
payroll taxes of:
$7,508 on the employee’s adjusted salary of $55,000 per year
$3,410 for Social Security,
$798 towards Medicare, and
$3,300 towards Unemployment Insurance.
The employer would gain total tax savings of $682, approximately 8%.
Depending upon levels of plan participation, these savings may cover, or even exceed, employers’ costs for 
administration of DCFSAs (Beam & McFadden, 1996; Mercer Human Resource Consulting, 2005).
The use-it-or-lose-it provision can be a boon for employers. When employees do not use their full DCFSA bal-
ances in a given year, the money is not refunded to employees as taxable income. Rather, the balance reverts 
to the employer. Thus, DCFSA forfeitures, in effect, result in employers recouping part of the cost of their 
workers’ annual salaries. 
According to a 2013 survey, approximately 2% of contributions to DCFSAs are forfeited to employers (Mercer 
Human Resource Consulting, 2013). In the case of an employee contributing the maximum amount to their 
DCFSA ($5,000), a 2% forfeiture amounts to a $100 salary savings for the employer.
Since DCFSAs are framed as an employer benefit that supports working parents, an argument could be 
made that offering DCFSAs should result in positive business outcomes. Since DCFSAs should reduce child 
care expenses for parents, these savings may enable parents to afford higher-quality, more stable child care 
arrangements, the argument goes. Better child care arrangements should enable parents to be absent less 
3.2 Reduced Salary Expenses: The Use-It-Or-Lose-It Provision
3.3 Theoretical Positive Business Outcomes for Employers
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As Kelly (2003) explains, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 included tax incentives that were meant to 
encourage employers to invest in on-site child care centers or pay subsidies to employees to offset child care 
expenses. In her analysis of the history of employer-sponsored child care, Kelly (2003) notes that, following 
the adoption of this legislation, employee benefits consulting firms saw an opportunity to parlay the lan-
guage of this tax law into a business opportunity for themselves, one not intended by legislators.
These consulting firms used the existing rules for cafeteria benefits plans (26 USC §125) as a basis for the 
rationale that tax-advantaged reimbursement accounts for dependent care expenses were a way for employ-
ers to help subsidize employees’ child care expenses. Thus, rather than offering direct payments to employ-
ees or building on-site child care centers, employers could lay claim to subsidizing child care for employees 
for the relatively low cost of administering reimbursement accounts. As a result, consulting firms created a 
profitable new line of business for themselves that enabled employers to inexpensively offer some level of 
support for employees with families (Kelly, 2003).
DCFSAs came into being in the early- to mid-1980s through the entrepreneurial efforts of several employee 
benefits consulting firms. Adoption rates were low initially and generally limited to companies with existing 
relationships with these firms. DCFSA design evolved slowly over time via requests for guidance from the 
IRS as to acceptable plan structures (Kelly, 2003). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) did not even include 
DCFSAs in their employer surveys until 2008; no data on these programs were collected in the BLS Employee 
Benefits Survey (1985 to 2006), the predecessor to the BLS National Compensation Survey (NCS).
frequently and be more productive while at work. However, no empirical evidence supports claims of busi-
ness outcomes due to the use of DCFSAs.
Ample evidence demonstrates negative outcomes for working parents associated with unstable or poor-
quality child care, such as increased absenteeism at work and lower productivity (Glass & Estes, 1997; Emlen 
& Koren, 1984). However, studies of workplace performance with respect to a range of child care benefits, 
such as on-site child care or employer-provided subsidy vouchers, present inconclusive evidence that a sig-
nificant connection exists between employer-supported child care and reduced absenteeism and increased 
productivity. 
Most positive outcomes related to child care benefits were self-reported or employer-reported improve-
ments in employee attitudes, which may have positive effects on retention and recruitment (Goff, Mount, 
& Jamison, 1990; Kossek & Nichol, 1992; Morrissey & Warner, 2011). One survey of employees who received 
child care subsidy vouchers from their employer revealed that a majority of voucher recipients reported 
improved attitudes towards their workplace. Only a small minority reported that the vouchers helped them 
avoid breakdowns in child care (Morrissey & Warner, 2011), which may cause parents to be absent from work 
(Hofferth, Brayfield, Deich, & Holcomb, 1991).
If evidence is lacking that rich child care benefits, such as on-site care and child care vouchers, result in posi-
tive business outcomes, it seems unlikely that employers can reap business benefits from offering DCFSAs, 
which provide employees with far less financial assistance.
4.1 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: Legislative Intentions and the Transformed  
        Meaning of “Subsidized”
4. Patterns of Adoption of DCFSAs
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Ever since DCFSAs were developed, U.S. workers have had uneven access to them. The BLS gathers data only 
for benefits that they deem timely and relevant in the national economy (N. Lavrenyuk, personal communi-
cation, December 19, 2018). In 2008, BLS began collecting data on DCFSA access (as opposed to general caf-
eteria plan access) via the National Compensation Survey. A decade later, only 42% of U.S. civilian workers 
(meaning private industry, state government, and local government workers) have access to DCFSAs through 
their employers (Acosta & Wiatrowski, 2008-2018). 
According to data from the BLS National Compensation Surveys (Acosta & Wiatrowski, 2008-2018), this pro-
portion has increased in the past decade, up from 34% in 2008, but the accounts still fail to reach over half 
of the U.S. workforce. Most access to DCFSAs is available through state and local government employment. 
Unlike the overall workforce, over half of state and local government workers have had access to DCFSAs for 
the past decade, rising from 52% in 2008 to 63% currently (Acosta & Wiatrowski, 2008-2018).  (Figure 1) 
4.2 DCFSA Adoption by Employers
Trends in DCFSA Employee Access Rates by Sector from 2008-2018
Note. Civilian workers includes private industry workers, state workers, and local government workers.
Data from National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the U.S., Bureau of Labor          
Statistics, 2008-2018.
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Note. Data from National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the U.S., Bureau of Labor           
            Statistics, 2008-2018.
Access to DCFSAs also varies by job type and compensation level. Employees in management and profes-
sional positions have much greater access to DCFSAs than workers in service and construction positions, for 
example (Figure 2). Similar divisions exist between full-time versus part-time workers and union versus non-
union employees (Figure 2). Full-time employees have more access to DCFSAs than part-time workers and 
union workers have more access than non-union workers. 
Employee DCFSA Access by Job Characteristics
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However, the most significant difference in DCFSA access can be seen by employer size; larger employers of-
fer considerably more access to DCFSAs than smaller employers. 
In 2018, 71% of workers whose employers had 500 or more employees had DCFSA access while only 21% of 
workers whose employers had fewer than 50 employees had DCFSA access. This difference may be due to 
the greater capacity of large employers to hire benefits administration companies for DCFSA management 
(Kelly, 2003). In some studies, small employers have noted that the burden of setting up and managing these 
accounts is a deterrent to offering them (e.g., Warner, Ribeiro, & Smith, 2003).  (Figure 4)
Employee DCFSA Access by Wage Level
Wage Level
Lowest 10% Highest 10%
Figure 3
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Starker differences in DCFSA access appear by wage level. Only 14% of workers in the NCS sample who have 
jobs paying in the lowest 10% of wages have access to DCFSAs. In contrast, 67% of workers who have jobs 
paying in the highest 10% of wages have access to these accounts. (Figure 3)
Note. Data from National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the U.S., Bureau of Labor           
            Statistics, 2008-2018.
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The difference in DCFSA offerings by employer size may also be due to the faster pace at which new practices 
tend to spread across large employers that focus on staying competitive with their benefits offerings. Rog-
ers’ (2003) diffusion of innovations theory suggests that employers may adopt new practices simply because 
others within their network have adopted them, rather than for reasons specific to their own business strate-
gies. According to this theory, innovations need not have an evidence-base of effectiveness for employers 
to adopt them. Rather, if employers learn that other employers have begun offering these benefits, they will 
tend to eventually offer them as well, regardless of any evaluation of the innovation. 
The BLS considers DCFSAs an emerging benefit that does not represent a significant cost for employers and 
thus does not collect data on utilization rates in order to minimize the burden on NCS survey respondents 
(N. Lavrenyuk, personal communication, December 19, 2018). As a result, employee utilization data are lim-
ited and the data that do exist suggest that employee utilization rates are low.
A 2003 report found that only 14% of employees with access to DCFSAs used them (Employee Benefits Re-
search Institute, 2003). A survey conducted in 2005 found the same utilization level; only 14% of employees 
with DCFSA access used them (Mercer Human Resource Consulting, 2005). However, evidence suggests that 
when employers make contributions to their workers’ DCFSAs, utilization rates can be much higher. A study 
of Cornell University’s DCFSA usage conducted in 2009 reported that 49.2% of eligible employees who were 
4.3 DCFSA Adoption by Employees
Trends in DCFSA Access for Civilian Workers by Employer Size
2008   2009         2010          2011        2012          2013        2014   2015         2016         2017         2018
Year
Employers of 500+ workersEmployers of <50 workers
Figure 4
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Note. Civilian workers includes private industry workers, state workers, and local government workers.
Data from National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the U.S., Bureau of Labor          
Statistics, 2008-2018.
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Distributed biannually to a random sample of LMI tax-filers using TurboTax Freedom Edition1, the first wave 
of the 2018 Household Financial Survey (HFS) included a module of questions about DCFSAs that was issued 
to all employed respondents who had dependents. These participants were asked whether or not their em-
ployers offered DCFSAs, whether or not they used DCFSAs, and why they did or did not use them.  
Data gathered through the HFS show that the majority of respondents either did not have access to a DCFSA 
or did not know whether or not they had access; 45% reported that their employer did not offer a DCFSA, 
24% were not sure, and 16% had never heard of DCFSAs (N=1,280). Only 15% of respondents reported that 
they did have access to a DCFSA, either through their own employer or their spouse or partner’s employer. 
This substantial difference between employees who reported that their employers did not offer DCFSAs and 
workers who reported that their employers did offer the accounts aligns with 2018 NCS findings regarding 
DCFSA access for LMI employees. The NCS access rate of 14% for the lowest decile of earners closely mirrors 
the 15% of HFS respondents who reported that they had access to DCFSAs. (Figure 5)
4.4 Insights from LMI Employees: The Household Financial Survey
4.4.1 Employee Access and Awareness
 Access to DCFSAs
surveyed had an active DCFSA that was funded, in part, through contributions from Cornell (Hipp, Morrissey, 
& Warner, 2017). 
It is possible that LMI employees’ conditions of work may make DCFSA participation particularly challeng-
ing. Unlike higher-paid employees, LMI workers are more likely to be employed in part-time positions that 
are not benefits-eligible (Lambert, 1993). Additionally, LMI workers tend to be employed in jobs with higher 
turnover rates (Lane, 2000), making participation in DCFSAs more difficult. Even if employees in these types 
of jobs are eligible for DCFSAs, the less stable nature of their employment would likely discourage them from 
participating in a year-long benefit program requiring a commitment of their own funds at the start of the 
plan year.    
Low levels of DCFSA utilization may also be attributed to a general lack of awareness concerning what      
DCFSAs are and whether or not an employer offers them. Data from a unique survey of LMI employees de-
scribed in the following section reflects this absence of DCFSA awareness, even among those who may have 
access to the accounts.
It is possible that these data may slightly overestimate the true number of respondents with DCFSA access. 
Among HFS respondents who reported that they had access to DCFSAs, some clearly misunderstood the 
question and gave responses that directly related to HCFSAs or health savings accounts (HSAs), which are a 
type of tax-advantaged employee benefit only available to those with high-deductible health care plans.
When asked why they did or did not choose to use DCFSAs, 97 respondents entered a written answer. Six-
teen of these respondents (~17%), nine of whom reported that they used DCFSAs and seven of whom report-
ed that they did not use DCFSAs, provided explanations specific to medical costs.
 Confusion between DCFSAs, HCFSAs, and health savings accounts (HSAs)
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Employee Access to DCFSAs: Household Financial Survey Findings
DCFSA Access
N=1280; yes=186, 14.53%; spouse or partner=8, 0.63%; no=579, 45.23%; not sure=301, 23.52%; never heard of it=206, 16.09%
Source: Household Financial Survey, 2018.
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Among those who reported that they used DCFSAs, written responses included, “I learned I could save up for 
medical stuff,” “prescription costs,” and “my parents told me it would be valuable when coming into medical 
expenses.” Among those who reported that they did not use DCFSAs, explanations included, “state health 
insurance,” “use HSA instead,” and “our children have Medicaid,” as reasons why they did not use the ac-
counts. One respondent confused the DCFSAs with HSAs, saying that they did not use the DCFSA because, “I 
opt to use the traditional low-deductible plan because I don’t think I would save money with the FSA.”
Since more employees have access to HCFSAs than to DCFSAs (Acosta & Wiatrowski, 2018), this confusion 
between the two account types is perhaps not surprising. Higher worker awareness of HCFSAs may also 
stem from variation in child care needs across the life cycle. HCFSAs may appeal to employees at any life 
stage since they are likely to incur health-related expenses, regardless of whether or not they have children 
young enough to require child care. In contrast, DCFSAs are only of use when employees have children 
young enough to attend child care. Thus, employer messages about HCFSA availability may resonate more 
frequently throughout employees’ careers.
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Among employees who reported having access to DCFSAs, findings from the HFS suggest that few used 
these accounts. Only 17% of respondents who indicated that they had access to DCFSAs used them. Further, 
it is possible that even fewer had access in reality, given the confusion with HCFSAs and HSAs that some 
respondents demonstrated (Figure 6). Additionally, some employees were even confused about their own 
account usage, with 4% saying they did not actually know whether or not they had used a DCFSA. 
Among employees with children under five years old, those most likely to have significant child care expens-
es, DCFSA utilization rates were higher (25% of employees). However, the largest group of respondents were 
non-users. Even among employees with the highest child care expenses, almost three-quarters chose not 
to use DCFSAs. Some potential reasons why employees with access to the accounts did not use DCFSAs are 
detailed in the following sections.
4.4.2 Employee Use of DCFSAs
DCFSA Utilization Rates for Employees with Dependents: Household Financial Survey Findings
Use of DCFSAs
All employees with dependents: N=194; Employees with children under five years old: N=60
Use Don’t Use Unsure
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5. Employee Participation Decisions: The Effects of Friction and Loss Aversion
The economic concept of friction refers to impediments to completing a transaction, such as the time and 
Between HFS respondents who reported not knowing what DCFSAs were and those who provided explana-
tions clearly referring to medical costs, it is evident that DCFSAs are not a widely understood benefit within 
this sample. 
Source: Household Financial Survey, 2018.
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energy required to research a consumer purchase or the expense of conducting a stock sale (Conant, 1908). 
In the case of DCFSAs, there are many points of friction that reduce the attractiveness of participation, in-
cluding the effort required to search out information about how DCFSAs work, the time and energy needed 
to calculate whether or not participation will be financially worthwhile, and the effort required to submit 
expenses for reimbursement.
The concept of loss aversion derives from prospect theory and is embodied in the famous behavioral eco-
nomics phrase, “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A large body of research dem-
onstrates that people will act in ways that seem counter to their own best interests to avoid losing some-
thing of value. In the case of DCFSAs, it appears that loss aversion plays a role in employees’ decisions not to 
participate in these plans even when they could benefit financially by doing so. Said another way, use-it-or-
lose-it looms larger than pre-tax savings.
Both friction and loss aversion appear to play roles in employees’ DCFSA participation decisions.
For LMI employees, there are three main barriers to DCFSA participation:
•	 Confusion about how programs work,
•	 Difficulty determining whether or not their families would benefit from DCFSA participation, and
•	 Difficulty managing the reimbursement arrangement that requires employees to both set money 
aside to pay for expenses and then pay for those expenses out-of-pocket.
The tax code is complex and communicating the value of DCFSA plans and the processes required to make 
use of them is a challenge for Human Resource (HR) departments. Additionally, LMI employees are more 
likely than their higher-paid counterparts to have lower reading levels, speak English as a second language, 
and/or work in non-office settings (e.g., warehouse operations, retail sales floors, home health care), making 
communication an even more challenging task (Wood, 2010; Capps, Fix, Passel, Ost, & Perez-Lopez, 2003; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).
Determining the benefit of participating in DCFSA plans relies upon employees’ ability to calculate and un-
derstand both their expected annual child care expenses and projected tax liability at year-end. Thus, decid-
ing whether or not they might expect to save money by participating in the program is a complicated task. 
Because of the use-it-or-lose-it provision, inaccurate estimates may come with the risk of losing a portion of 
their salaries. 
Finally, the so-called “double-hit,” meaning, employees must pay for care out-of-pocket while setting money 
aside with which to reimburse themselves, may make participation financially infeasible for LMI employees 
due to limits of cash flow throughout the month.
5.1 Barriers to LMI Employee Participation in DCFSAs
Responses to questions about DCFSAs in the HFS highlight a significant barrier to using the accounts: em-
ployee confusion as to what they are and how they function. Of respondents with young children (under age 
5.1.1 Confusion and Complexity: Eligibility, Expenses, and Access to Funds
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Primary Reason for DCFSA Non-Use2 : Household Financial Survey Findings
Percentage Agreement
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Loss aversion
Can’t afford to use
Figure 7
N=42
For employees to determine whether or not they are eligible to participate in their employers’ DCFSAs, em-
ployees must first determine whether their families’ work arrangements and marital/custody configurations 
fit with eligibility requirements. Employees must locate the information, apply the rules to their particular 
circumstances, and decide whether or not they are eligible to participate.
As previously explained, only families who use child care in order for the parent(s) to work, look for work, or 
attend school full-time are eligible to participate in DCFSAs. Thus, a two-parent family that uses child care 
while one parent works part-time and/or attends school part-time would not be eligible to participate in a 
DCFSA. 
Eligibility rules for divorced parents are complex and dependent upon the IRS definition of “custodial par-
ent,” the parent with whom the child lived for the greatest number of nights during the prior year. Special 
rules apply for divorced parents who work nights. 
If the child lived with both parents for an equal number of nights, the parent with the highest adjusted gross 
income (AGI) would be deemed the custodial parent and would be eligible to participate in a DCFSA. Thus, 
if an employee is the lower-earning parent in a divorced family with equal custody, they would be ineligible 
5) who had access to DCFSAs but chose not to use them, the most commonly cited reason was confusion 
about how the plans worked. (Figure 7)
 Complexity in determining employee eligibility 
Source: Household Financial Survey, 2018.
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to participate in their employer’s DCFSA. No rationale is given in the regulations to explain why the parent 
who may have fewer financial resources to pay for child care is denied eligibility for a DCFSA, which has the 
potential to reduce the parent’s child care expenses (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2017).
If employees determine that they are indeed eligible to participate in their employers’ DCFSAs, they must 
next determine whether or not their child care expenses are eligible for reimbursement. This question rests 
upon employees understanding the eligibility requirements related to “qualifying dependents.”
As previously noted, to be a qualifying dependent, a child must be under the age of 13 years old (or an older 
child who is not physically or mentally able to care for themselves) and live with the employee for at least 
half the year, as per the above rules for divorced parents. Once employees have determined whether or not 
they have qualifying dependents, they must next consider the type of child care for which they would seek 
reimbursement.
As noted earlier, expenses for child care provided in either the parents’ home or the home of the child care 
provider, such as a nanny, au pair, babysitter, or relative who is not the employee’s dependent and who has 
a taxpayer identification number, are eligible for reimbursement. However, the child care provider cannot be 
the employee’s spouse or the child’s other parent. 
Expenses for daycare centers and preschools that meet all state and local regulations are also eligible for 
reimbursement, as are expenses related to before- and after-school care that is required so that parents can 
work or attend school full-time. When school is not in session, expenses for day camps qualify for reimburse-
ment. However, overnight camps, enrichment programs, lessons, and tutoring expenses are not eligible 
expenses.
It is important to note that, in households in which an employee has both children who live with them full-
time and children who live with them part-time (less than half of the year), child care expenses would not be 
reimbursable for the children who live there part-time, even if the same child care arrangement is used for 
all children. So, for example, if both a child living with the family full-time and a child living with the family 
for less than half of the year attend the same after-school child care program, only the expenses for the first 
child would be reimbursable.
 Complexity in identifying eligible child care expenses
Once employees have determined that they have child care expenses that are eligible for reimbursement 
through DCFSAs, they face another possible point of confusion. Many employers that offer DCFSAs also offer 
HCFSAs. As evidenced by written responses in the HFS, employees may confuse the two types of accounts. 
For example, as previously mentioned, one respondent indicated that they did not use a DCFSA because, 
“Our children have Medicaid.”
One risk of such confusion relates to the variation in reimbursement processing between DCFSAs and      
HCFSAs due to the uniform coverage rule. The uniform coverage rule applies to HCFSAs and requires that 
employees have access to the full amount of their annual elected contributions immediately at the start of 
the plan year. In contrast, DCFSA funds are not available for reimbursement until the contributions have 
been deducted from employees’ paychecks. 
 Complexity due to variations between DCFSA and HCFSA provisions
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Having determined their eligibility for their employers’ DCFSAs and the eligibility of their child care expenses 
for reimbursement, employees must consider the implications of the lack of a uniform coverage rule for   
DCFSAs and reimbursement procedures.
For LMI employees, the double-hit of paying for care out-of-pocket while setting money aside with which to 
reimburse themselves appears to be the most substantial barrier of all to DCFSA participation.
5.1.2 The Double-Hit: (Lack of) Availability of DCFSA Funds
Dependent Care 
Flexible Spending Accounts
Health Care 
Flexible Spending Accounts
Method of Funding Salary reduction plan
(pre-tax employee contributions)
Salary reduction plan
(pre-tax employee contributions)
Eligible Expenses Dependent care expenses for quali-
fying persons which are necessary 
for the caregivers to work, look for 
work, or go to school full-time
Dental, medical, and vision expens-
es not covered by health care plan 
for employee and dependents; no 
work or school requirement
IRS Regulations Governing 
the Plan
IRS section 125: cafeteria plans and 
IRS section 129: dependent care 
assistance plans
IRS section 125: cafeteria plans
Length of Optional* Grace 
Period After Plan Year
75 days 75 days
Maximum Contribution Per 
Year
$5,000 $2,500
Use-It-Or-Lose-It Rules Employees forfeit unused funds af-
ter grace period; forfeited balances 
revert to employer
Employees can carry up to $500 
to the next plan year; amounts in 
excess of $500 revert to employer
Uniform Coverage? No, employees may only use what 
has been contributed at the time of 
reimbursement request
Yes, employees may use the full 
amount of annual elected contribu-
tions beginning on the first day of 
the plan year
*Employer is not required to offer a grace period
Table 1
Table 1 shows the variation in provisions between DCFSAs and HCFSAs.  Employees who are aware of the dif-
ference in reimbursement rules between the two types of accounts must take into consideration the implica-
tions of the more restrictive reimbursement rules associated with DCFSAs, as explained below.
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The double-hit requires employees to have twice the cost of their child care available in their monthly cash 
flow. LMI employees who are likely living paycheck-to-paycheck are unlikely to have this kind of slack in their 
monthly budgets. One HFS participant with young children who did not use an available DCFSA explained 
the decision by responding, “[I] don’t make enough money.”
DCFSA reimbursement procedures require employees to submit documentation of child care expenses for 
approval before funds can be disbursed. As a result, in addition to managing twice the cost of child care in 
their monthly cash flow, employees must be prepared for a time lag between expense submission and reim-
bursement. They must also allow for the possibility that a claim may be denied initially and, thus, delayed.
Coordinating timing of paychecks, DCFSA deductions, child care expense payments, and reimbursements is 
both crucial and risky for LMI employees. A lack of alignment could result in high fees for bank account over-
drafts. Findings from the HFS indicate that, indeed, LMI employees with young children (under age 5) who 
used DCFSAs were more likely to overdraft their bank accounts than those who did not use DCFSAs (χ2(1)= 
4.76, p<0.05).
 Timing is everything: Bank overdrafts
 Not without a cushion: Financial illiquidity 
Findings from the HFS also suggest that LMI employees recognized the risk of timing problems with DCFSA 
reimbursement and avoided enrolling in them unless they had a financial cushion available to make DCFSA 
use feasible.
Survey respondents were asked whether or not they could find $2,000 in case of an emergency. Among 
respondents with young children (under age 5) who had access to DCFSAs, those who were liquidity-con-
strained (“probably” or “certainly” could not find $2,000 in case of an emergency) were less likely to use 
DCFSAs than those who “probably” or “certainly” could find $2,000 in case of an emergency (χ2(3)= 10.09, 
p<0.05). These results suggest that LMI employees who did not have a financial cushion may have found 
DCFSA participation unmanageable.
The flow chart on the following page maps the steps employees must navigate from the point of deciding 
to participate in a DCFSA, to determining their eligibility and the eligibility of their child care expenses, to 
maneuvering through the reimbursement process.
5.2 Navigating the Process: From Decision to Reimbursement
When employees weigh the decision to participate in a DCFSA, in order to evaluate whether or not participat-
ing will benefit them financially, they must be able to forecast with a high level of certainty, 1) their expected 
child care costs for the plan year, and 2) their expected tax liability for the plan year, which will determine 
how much they may save by paying for child care with pre-tax dollars.
5.2.1 Is a DCFSA Worth the Trouble?  A Complicated Task
LMI workers are often employed in fields with unstable and unpredictable scheduling practices, such as 
 Estimating the cost of child care
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Paying for child care on a pre-tax basis is the key selling point of DCFSAs. However, employees’ tax liabilities 
vary widely based upon their personal circumstances. Thus, determining the amount of tax savings that can 
be expected from DCFSA participation can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. In order to accurately 
estimate how much they may save in taxes, LMI employees must consider how certain tax credits and Medic-
aid eligibility may interact with DCFSAs.
 Estimating tax liability: Tax credits and Medicaid 
  The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC)
DCFSAs are not the only tax-related benefit that can help employees with child care expenses; some work-
ers may be eligible to use the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC). The CDCTC and DCFSAs are not 
mutually exclusive; however, they can only be used together under specific circumstances.
The CDCTC allows tax filers to reduce the taxes they owe by receiving a tax credit for child care expenses 
from the previous year. Families may receive a credit based upon a maximum of $6,000 in child care expens-
es for households with two or more children. The CDCTC is a non-refundable tax credit, meaning, if filers do 
not owe any taxes, they will not receive tax refunds or increase their tax refund size by claiming this credit.
Child care expenses that have been reimbursed through a DCFSA may not be used to claim the CDCTC. How-
ever, if tax filers spend more on child care than the amount reimbursed through DCFSAs, they may apply the 
remaining amount to the calculation for the CDCTC, up to a total of $6,000 in child care expenses. 
The example below shows the interaction between the CDCTC and DCFSA participation for a family with two 
or more children:
Annual child care expense………………………………..……………………..….….....$7,500
Child care expenses reimbursed through a DCFSA……………………………….........$5,000
Remaining child care expense to be applied to CDCTC
     (CDCTC limit [$6,000] – amount reimbursed through DCFSA [$5,000])...............….$1,000
Child care expense not subject to favorable tax treatment…………………………....$1,500
retail, home health care, and food service, that make it difficult for parents to arrange stable, high-quality 
child care (Carrillo, Harknett, Logan, Luhr, & Schneider, 2017; Henly & Lambert, 2014). Instability in child care 
arrangements, in addition to being associated with negative outcomes for children (Loeb, Fuller, Kagan, & 
Carrol, 2004), makes it difficult for parents to take advantage of financial supports for affording quality child 
care, such as state and federal child care subsidies (Henly et al., 2015). Uncertainty about their ability to use 
child care subsidies and the unpredictability of the cost of frequently-changing care arrangements makes 
calculating annual child care expenses extremely difficult. 
Both the use-it-or-lose-it provision and associated strict limitations on changing DCFSA contribution 
amounts set up the possibility of a loss aversion response. Difficulty in confidently estimating the cost of 
child care in order to determine appropriate contribution amounts and avoid forfeiture may serve as a deter-
rent to participation among LMI employees, even if doing so could possibly garner some tax savings (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979).
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In this example, the family’s annual child care expense of $7,500 is split into three parts as far as tax benefits 
are concerned. First, $5,000 of expenses were paid for with pre-tax dollars through use of a DCFSA for reim-
bursement. Next, $1,000 was claimed as a tax credit during year-end tax filing by using the CDCTC. Finally, 
$1,500 was not eligible for any favorable tax treatment.
The example above represents the most beneficial distribution of child care expenses between the CDCTC 
and DCFSAs for tax filers with incomes above $43,000 per year. Because the CDCTC offers a larger tax credit 
to lower-income tax filers, some LMI families who owe taxes at the end of the year will likely receive a larger 
benefit from using the CDCTC alone and not participating in a DCFSA. 
The CDCTC provides a credit of 35% of child care expenses (up to a maximum of $6,000 in expenses) for tax 
filers earning less than $15,000 per year. The value of the credit declines incrementally, down to 20% of child 
care expenses (up to a maximum of $6,000 in expenses) for tax filers earning $43,000 or more. 
As a result, LMI employees considering using DCFSAs must be cognizant of the possibly greater benefit of 
applying their child care expenses toward the CDCTC up to the $6,000 maximum. Employees would need 
to estimate their adjusted gross income (AGI) and child care expenses, calculate the tax credit they would 
receive from the CDCTC, and then compare the resulting tax savings against tax savings from making pre-tax 
contributions to a DCFSA, taking into account deductions for Social Security (FICA) and Medicare.
These calculations require daunting and complex estimates of income, tax deductions, and child care ex-
penses. Some HFS respondents commented that they chose not to use a DCFSA because the CDCTC offered 
greater savings. Others explained that they chose to apply their child care expenses to the CDCTC rather 
than use a DCFSA because it was easier to use; the CDCTC does not require submission of documentation for 
reimbursement. Thus, families can claim the CDCTC without dealing with the double-hit of contributing to a 
DCFSA while paying out-of-pocket for child care.
For LMI families, another tax credit may also play a role in the DCFSA participation decision-making process: 
the Earned Income Tax Credit.
  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
DCFSA contributions are deducted from employees’ paychecks before taxes, the key selling point for these 
accounts. The underlying premise is that lowering taxable income is beneficial for employees.
However, LMI workers may be eligible for the EITC, a refundable tax credit meant to reduce poverty and 
reward work. Figure 8 displays the incentive structure of the EITC for households of varying sizes. Variation 
in the incentive for LMI workers to earn more money, thus raising their AGIs, is inherent in the design of the 
EITC. At some points along the curve, workers have a substantial incentive to increase their AGIs, making 
DCFSA participation, which lowers taxable income, resulting in a lower AGI, undesirable. At other points, 
workers’ refundable credit amounts decline as AGI increases. In these circumstances, DCFSA participation 
benefits LMI workers by decreasing their taxable income and AGI, leading to an increase in the EITC amount 
they would receive. 
Medicaid, the federal health insurance program for low-income Americans, is a valuable benefit for some 
  Medicaid
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EITC Refund Amounts By Tax-Filer Income and Dependents (2018 Values)
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of the most vulnerable members of the U.S. workforce. The decrease in taxable income and, thus, AGI that 
DCFSA participation generates impacts not only EITC eligibility, but also Medicaid eligibility. 
To qualify for Medicaid, applicants must have modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) that falls below a cer-
tain percentage of the federal poverty line (FPL). MAGI is calculated by taking AGI and removing certain tax 
deductions from the calculation, such as the student loan interest deduction. 
The FPL percentage for Medicaid eligibility varies in states that have not expanded Medicaid under provi-
sions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). A majority of states have expanded Medicaid under the ACA; in those 
states, the income eligibility mark falls at 138% FPL. For a family of three in 2018, 138% FPL equals an annual 
income of $28,676. 
Unlike the EITC, Medicaid eligibility is not subject to a phase-out period; families with incomes over the cap 
will not qualify for any portion of Medicaid. Thus, for families whose MAGI slightly exceeds the eligibility 
threshold, even a modest DCFSA contribution could lower their MAGI enough to qualify, generating a sub-
stantial financial benefit in the form of Medicaid coverage (Rosenbaum, Gonzales, & Trisi, 2013).
Note. Data from U.S. Department of the Treasury. Internal Revenue Service. (2018).
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The following is an example of some of the calculations an LMI employee would have to make to determine 
the potential benefit of using a DCFSA. The example given is for a single employee with one child making a 
gross income of $40,000 and paying $2,000 a year* for child care. This income is just below 250% of the fed-
eral poverty line for a family size of two, and falls just within the range of EITC eligibility. 
*This is a low estimate of 5% of household income. Affordable child care is considered to be no more 
than 10% of household income. In almost all states, the average cost of childcare well exceeds this stan-
dard.
5.2.2 One LMI Employee’s Dilemma: 
Calculating the savings between not using a DCFSA and using a DCFSA for one adult and one dependent 
making $40,000 annually and paying $2,000 a year for child care with DCFSA contributions equal to this 
amount:
 Yearly paycheck withholding difference = $679.56 - $479.64 =  $199.92
+ EITC refund difference = $367.00 - $47.00 =     $320.00
 Total savings =        $519.92 yearly
          [$43.33 per month]
1. Annual income: $40,000
2. Pay frequency: monthly
3. Number of paychecks/year: 12
4. Paycheck amount: $3,333.33 gross
5. Monthly child care costs: $166.67
6. Yearly child care costs: $2,000
7. Tax withholding from monthly paycheck: 
 Personal allowances: 7; therefore, 
 10% withholding rate applied to 
 paycheck amount minus $2,767.00
          ($3,333.33 - $2,767.00) x 10% = $56.63
8. Yearly withholding ($56.63 x 12) = $679.56
9. Full CDCTC amount without use of DCFSA = 
22% (determined by income) x $2,000 = $440
However, because this credit is not refund-
able, this tax filer would not receive any of 
this sum in their refund.
10. EITC refund amount = $47
1. Annual income: $40,000 (- $2,000 from FSA 
contribution = $38,000)
2. Pay frequency: monthly
3. Number of paychecks/year: 12
4. Paycheck amount: $3,166.67 gross
5. Monthly child care costs: $166.67
6. Yearly child care costs: $2,000
7. Tax withholding from monthly paycheck: 
 Personal allowances: 7; therefore, 
 10% withholding rate applied to 
 paycheck amount minus $2,767.00
           ($3,166.67 - $2,767.00) x 10% = $39.97
8. Yearly withholding ($39.97 x 12) = $479.64
9. Not eligible for CDCTC due to FSA use for full 
amount of child care costs
10. EITC refund amount = $367 
Additional questions: 
•	 Is it possible to cover expenses given the double-hit?  Paycheck will go from                                
[$3,333.33 - $56.63 =] $3,276.70 to [$3,166.67 - $39.97 =] $3,126.70 per month and child care expens-
es might need to be paid for out-of-pocket before reimbursement, meaning the amount left over 
might go from [$3,276.70 - $166.67 =] $3,110.03 to [$3,126.40 - $166.67 =] $2,959.73.
•	 If it is possible to cover monthly expenses with $2,959.73, is $519.92 worth the uncertainty about 
reimbursement and challenge of figuring out all of these calculations?
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6. Conclusion
In this first part of a two-part series, we reviewed the DCFSA landscape from the perspective of LMI parents, 
illuminating the nearly unmanageable barriers to participation and highly complex decision-making they 
must face in order to squeeze even the smallest benefit from these programs. 
While DCFSAs offer employers and higher-paid employees some benefits, as currently designed they offer 
much less value to LMI parents. In fact, analysis from the Household Financial Survey indicates that DCFSA 
participation is actually associated with a higher risk of overdrawing bank accounts among LMI parents with 
young children. With so few family-supportive programs and policies available to American workers, DCFSA 
design represents a sad missed opportunity to offer even minimal assistance to U.S. working families who 
need it most.
In Part 2 of this series, we examine some infrequently-provided options in DCFSA design and program ad-
ministration, as well as opportunities for improvements in public policies and employer practices that can 
help level the DCFSA playing field for LMI parents.
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End Notes
1. Via Refund-to-Savings, a collaborative initiative among Washington University in St. Louis, Intuit Corpo-
ration, and Duke University to test behavioral interventions to encourage LMI tax filers to save all or part 
of their refunds.
2. The categories reflected in this figure contain the following responses:
Plan mechanics confusing and unclear included: “unsure how it works,” “unsure how it works with joint 
custody,” and “unsure about money saved.”
No need included written-in variants of having free care, family care, and no child care expenses.
Not worth the trouble included: “money saved isn’t worth the trouble,” and “DCTC is easier.”
Unaware of accounts included: “don’t know what it is,” and written responses confusing the accounts 
with HCFSAs or HSAs.
DCTC saves more money only included this response option.
Loss aversion included: “use it or lose it,” and “benefits may be lost.”
Can’t afford to use represents the response of “don’t make enough money.”
3.      “DCTC” refers to the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, often abbreviated as either DCTC or CDCTC.
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